This paper formulates a dynamic stochastic model to examine the joint patent application and renewal behaviors under an international patent-protection regime.
Introduction
During the past two decades, patent evaluation has attracted considerable academic scrutiny, for both public policy analysis and business purpose. As patent value is not directly observable, researchers have experimented with many different approaches to impute it, using various patent characteristics including simple patent counts (Griliches 1990 ), forward citations made by other patents (Trajtenberg (1990) , Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) , Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) ), the length of patent life (most notably Pakes and Schankerman (1984) , Pakes (1986) , Lanjouw (1998) , and Schankerman (1998)), and the family size of the patent (i.e., the number of countries in which the patent holder seeks for patent protection - Putnam (1997) , Eaton, Kortum, and Lerner (2003) , Deng (2007) ).
This paper extends the existing literature by developing a dynamic stochastic patent applicationrenewal model and examining the joint determination of patent family size and length of patent life, thus facilitates the combination of information from both dimensions to estimate the distribution of patent value. Most relevant studies in the literature focus on either the family size or the length of the patent life in one country, but seldom examine both in a unified framework. 1 This paper builds such a framework, in which a representative patent applicant has to estimate, ex-ante, how potentially valuable his invention will be in each country and decides which countries to seek patent protection. After the patent application being granted, the patent holder then updates his evaluation of the patent rights in each country based on the information he gradually learns, period by period, and decides whether to keep the patents alive in each country, till they finally lapse.
In examining patent holders' renewal behavior, one needs to realize that patent renewal is an optimizing process, during which a patent holder compares the renewal costs to the expected future returns of the patent and decides how long the patent should be kept alive. Thus the length of a patent's life reveals useful information about the patent's private value to its owner.
Similarly, in choosing which countries to seek patent protection, a prospective applicant would also compare the application costs with the expected future returns in each country, and decide which countries to apply. Applicants with high-valued inventions tend to seek protection in more countries, ceteris paribus. Therefore, examining the joint distribution of family size and the length of patent life across different countries will allow us to distinguish more aspects of the patent value, and advance our understanding of how the patent value changes over time as well as across different countries.
Examining patents' joint application-renewal behavior may also shed light on some puzzles revealed by the patenting data. Normally, an invention that has been filed for patent protection in more countries tends to live longer in those countries (Putnam (1997) ), as both a larger patent family size and longer patent lives are consistent with a higher value of the underlying invention.
However, in studying the patenting behavior under the EPO (European Patent Office) regime, Deng (2007) finds an interesting albeit confusing pattern, that patent applicants from pharmaceutical industry tend to file applications in more countries than applicants from other industries, and applicants from electronics industry file in the fewest countries; however, electronics patents have the longest average patent life among all industries, whereas pharmaceutical patents have the shortest. Therefore, evaluation based on family sizes and the length of patent lives will give contradicting inferences on the relative value of these patents. This disparity cannot be easily resolved by either a multi-country patent application model or a renewal model alone, but calls for a joint examination of the patent application and renewal behaviors.
While the joint application-renewal model established in this paper can be applied to analyze any international patenting behavior in a dynamic stochastic setting, the empirical part of the paper focuses on examining the EPO patenting behavior. 2 Founded in 1977, the European Patent Office (EPO) provides a unified patent application and examination procedure for its member countries. Instead of filing a patent application and going through a tedious examination and granting process in each and every country in which an inventor intends to seek patent protection, an EPO patent applicant only needs to file a single application and, upon paying a per-country designation fee, chooses which countries to designate for future patent protection.
Once the application is granted, he can then transfer it to the national patent office of the designated countries and enjoy the same patent protection as a national patent holder. The patent designation records in the EPO, when combined with the patent renewal records in individual EPO member countries as well as data on the application, transferring, renewal, and possible litigation expenses, make it possible to examine the EPO patent holders' joint 2 I thank Ariel Pakes and Jean Lanjouw for kindly allowing me to use this data set. The original source of the data set is obtained from the European Patent Office, and the data assembly is funded by the OECD. application-renewal behavior. Moreover, as Eaton, Kortum and Lerner (2003) note, the EPO has almost entirely replaced direct applications to national patent offices: in most of 1990s "patents that do not originate with the EPO constitute fewer than 10 percent of patent applications arriving at the national patent offices." Thus our analysis has direct bearings on one of the most important international patent protection regime in the world.
Model estimation is based on a sample of patents from two technology fields: pharmaceutical and electronics, as our interest is also inspired by the puzzling patenting behaviors in these two fields as described above. Literature has provided different answers in regard to the relative value of patents in these two technology fields, and our empirical analysis make contributions also by presenting new evidence based on a much larger, more comprehensive, and more recent patent sample.
A few key findings emerge from model estimation:
First, pharmaceutical patents are endowed with higher initial returns, thus their owners tend to seek protection in more countries than electronics patent holders. However, their value depreciates substantially faster than the value of electronics patents, and consequently they have lower renewal rates and shorter lives; Secondly, patent value in different countries is highly correlated with the market size of the country. In particular, pharmaceutical patents exhibit an approximately constant returns to scale, whereas electronics patents show a significantly increasing returns to scale. This has important policy implications and is a distinct contribution to the literature, as previous studies provide little evidence regarding the scale of economy of the patent value across different countries;
Finally, the learning process of the EPO patents are significantly longer than that of the national patents as estimated in previous studies: while Pakes (1986) reports that most national patent holders in Germany, France and the U.K. stop exploiting new ways to utilize their patented ideas 5 years after the initial patent applications, our estimates imply that such learning processes are not essentially over until 10 years after the initial applications in many countries.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 formulates a dynamic stochastic model to examine the international patent application and renewal behavior. The EPO patent data set is described in Section 3, along with a summary of the characteristics of pharmaceutical and electronics patent groups. Section 4 reports the estimation results of the joint applicationrenewal model as well as the Monte Carlo simulation results. Section 5 concludes.
A Dynamic Stochastic International Patenting Model
This section develops a dynamic stochastic model to analyze the joint behavior of patent application and renewal under an international patent protection regime (here the EPO), combining the stochastic patent renewal models developed by Pakes (1986) and Lanjouw (1998) and the static deterministic patent application models in Putnam (1997) and Deng (2007) . In particular, at the beginning of period one, a representative patent applicant i is to decide whether to seek patent protection in country j = 1, 2, ..., J, given the fact that the future returns to patent protection are uncertain. Once the patent application is granted, at the beginning of each period thereafter the patent holder has to decide whether to pay a renewal fee in each country to keep the patent in force over the coming period. The inventor aims at maximizing the expected discounted value of future returns, and is uncertain about the sequence of stochastic returns that will be generated in later periods if the patent is to be kept alive. At the beginning of each period he receives new information about patent returns and makes his renewal decision accordingly.
The Renewal Decision Rule in a Single Country
We start by analyzing the renewal problem faced by a patent holder i in a single country j at age t of the patent's life, conditional on that the patent has been granted and kept alive in this country till age t − 1.
As noted in Pakes (1986) , the value of a patent at the beginning of period t consists of two parts -the return r i,j,t to be collected in current period, and the value of an option to continue to renew the patent in the future. In case that the total benefit from keeping the patent alive is less than the renewal cost c j,t , patent value will become zero forever as the holder will simply choose not to renew the patent and let it permanently lapse. Thus the value of patent i in country j can be expressed as:
with subscripts i and j omitted. β denotes the discount factor, T the statutory limit to patent life (20 years in Europe), and E t the expectation operator conditional on the information available up to age t. V (T + 1, .) = 0 as the patent expires after age T .
We assume that the evolution of patent returns follows a stochastic Markov process which is governed by three factors:
First, in each period with probability (1 − θ) the patent is subject to obsolescence. As Deng (2004) argues, obsolescence occurs when there is a major technological breakthrough in the same area which makes the current patented invention completely worthless. If it occurs the patent holder will naturally choose not to pay the renewal fee from now on and will let the patent lapse.
Secondly, even if there is no major technological breakthrough leading to a complete obsolescence, the existence of competing innovations of smaller technological progress will still gradually erode the monopoly of the patented invention, and this effect is assumed to depreciate the patent returns r t at a constant rate δ over time.
Finally, as most patent holders constantly collect new information on the market and experiment with new commercial strategies to exploit the profitability of their inventions over time,
we assume that at the beginning of each period the patent holder learns a realized value of a random variable z t as the outcome of the new commercial experiment. Note that new strategies may not always result in a more profitable use of the patented idea, and if this is the case the current period's patent return will simply be the depreciated return δr t−1 from the previous period.
Therefore, the assumed evolution of the patent returns is such that, with probability 1 − θ, the patent becomes obsolete and the patent value becomes zero forever, and with probability θ,
where z t is further assumed to be drawn from a two-parameter exponential distribution:
with γ ≥ 0 and σ t = φ t−1 σ with 0 < φ ≤ 1. As noted by Lanjouw (1998) , patent holders tend to experiment with strategies which they believe to be most lucrative first. Therefore, here σ t 's are specified to decay over time to make sure that the probability of drawing returns higher than any given level declines over the patent life.
A patent grants its holder an exclusive right to utilize the patented invention and gather monopoly profits. However, in reality patents are subject to possible infringement or challenges and have to be defended by their owners, and pursuing prosecution incurs litigation expenses.
In particular, in many European countries litigation expenses are calculated based on a "value- Litigation costs LC = l 0 + l 1 * V OC
Assuming that an infringement suit will take three years before a ruling 4 , and with probability w the patent holder wins the case, the patent value in age t becomes
where E t V L(t + 1, r t+1 ) is the expected value of future returns given that the patent holder is in the second year of litigation process.
Pakes (1986) provides the regularity conditions for the existence of a unique solution to a similar patent renewal problem and discusses the general form of the solution. In particular, for each country j there exists a threshold minimal return r * jt for each age, and the representative patent holder pays the renewal fee c jt if and only if the current return r jt equals or exceeds the threshold minimal return r * jt : r jt ≥ r * jt . Moreover, r * jt is non-decreasing in t, and is implicitly defined by:
In the empirical analysis later, l0 and l1 are obtained by regressing the observed litigation expenses on the VOC in individual countries, prior to the full-model estimation. For countries charging a fixed amount of litigation costs (such as France), l1 is set to zero. 4 As Lanjouw (1998) notes, patent suits in Germany typically are completed within three years. The estimations on the duration of such cases in other European countries, however, are currently not available. In the following sections, a three-year duration is assumed for all other EPO member countries.
The series of the minimal renewal return {r * jt } T t=1 in this renewal problem can then be solved backwards with the terminal condition V (T + 1, r j,T +1 ) = 0. 5 Details of model solution are specified in a technical appendix.
The Application and Designation Decision Rules
Next we examine the patent application problem. Patent application with the EPO is a two-stage process. When the application is submitted, the applicant has to decide which EPO member countries to designate, by paying a per-country designation fee, to keep the option of transferring the granted EPO application into national patents in these countries later. The application then goes through an examination process that usually takes three to four years (Deng 2007) . Once the patent application is granted the applicant has to decide whether to pay an additional lump-sum expense (including translation and other administrative costs) in each of the designated countries and continue to seek patent protection in that country.
The problem is solved backward. Conditional on the patent application being granted and country j has been designated, at the beginning of age four the patentee has to decide whether to transfer the granted application to the national patent office in member country j. Therefore, the patent value at age 4 in this country is:
where h j = w j − l j1 (1 − w j ) is determined by the litigation cost parameters l j,1 and the winning probability w j in country j, C j,4 the sum of the lump-sum transfer expenses and the renewal fee due at the national patent office for age 4, and E 4 V L(5, r j,5 ) the expected value of the future returns in the following two years. The patentee will pay C j,4 and obtain a national patent in country j if and only if r j,4 ≥ r * j,4 , with r * j,4 solving the following function:
Similarly, the patent value in country j in age one can be expressed as 6 :
where C 1 is the per-country designation cost, and η i the probability that the patent application i will be granted (we assume that the official examination is an exogenous process and the final granting decision is out of the applicant's control). Again, one can show that there exists a unique minimal designation return r * j,1 above which the patent applicant is going to designate in country j.
So far we have defined the stochastic Markov process generating the distribution of {r t } T t=2 for a given r 1 and solved for the conditional decision rules throughout the patent life. What is left to be specified is the distributions of the initial return r 1 . We assume that the initial return of any patent i in country j is lognormally distributed 7 , and
That is, the initial return r ij1 is determined by a common (across different country j's) factor α i , a list of patent-specific characteristics X i including patent cohort dummies, the real GDP of country j to approximate the market size of the patented innovation in the destination country, and an idiosyncratic factor ε ij . υ is the parameter measuring the degree of returns to scale. The common factor α i is normally distributed as N (μ α , σ 2 α ) and is independent of ε ij . Previous international patenting studies usually assume that the idiosyncratic factor ε ij 's are independently distributed across destination countries (Putnam 1997 and Deng 2007) . While this assumption greatly simplifies the model solution and estimation, one needs to realize the possibility that such shocks to patent returns may be correlated across countries. To accommodate this possibility, the idiosyncratic factor ε ij 's are assumed to follow a multi-dimensional 6 The value of a pending patent right largely depends on what kind of remedies the patentee would be able to collect for infringement that occurs before the patent being finally granted. For simplicity, in the following analysis I assume that the patent holders will be able to collect full patent returns during examination period through litigations filed after the patents are granted, as they are entitled to by patent laws in many countries. 7 Schankerman and Pakes (1986) find that the log-normal distribution fits the renewal data better than any other kind of distribution they have tried. Schankerman (1998) also finds the log-normal is the most suitable distribution.
normal distribution N (0, Σ ε ), with the pair-wise correlation between shocks in country j and k, ε ij and ε ik , is determined by the geographical distance between these two destination countries:
where d ij is the spherical distance between the capitals of country j and k, and τ a parameter to be estimated. With τ > 0, equation (2.11) ensures that the correlation ρ jk diminishes with geographical distance, so if d ij is zero, the correlation is one, and when d ij goes to infinity, the correlation approaches zero.
Finally, to capture the effects of the market sizes on the magnitude of the learning probabilities, the p.d.f. of the learned value in any specific country j at age t, z ijt , is defined as
where σ jt = φ t−1 σ j with 0 < φ ≤ 1, and σ j = (GDP j ) υ σ. In other words, the realizations of z ijt in any specific country j are assumed to be proportional to the size of the economy, as in defining the distributions of the initial returns in equation (2.10).
Moment Conditions and Estimation Algorithm
Given the conditional distribution of r t+1 , G t+1 (s|t) = prob(r t+1 ≤ s|t) and the distribution of the initial return, it is straightforward to derive the c.d.f. of r ijt :
Therefore, in any cohort group of patents, the proportion of patent holders who pay the renewal fees in age t in country j is simply the proportion with current return r ijt exceeding the minimal renewal return r * jt , or 1 − F j (r * jt , t). The hazard rate, i.e., the proportion of patents lapsing at age t in country j is thus the proportion not paying the renewal fee at age t out of those having paid throughout age t − 1:
Similarly, the hazard rate between age 1 (the initial application) and age 4 (when the granted patents are to be transferred to country j), conditional on the country having been designated in the initial application, is
And finally, the proportion of patents not designated in country j at the time of initial application is
Equations (2.12) to (2.15) provide the moment conditions required for the estimation. Specifically,
where π(ω) is an m-variate vector stacking up the hazard probabilities of all cohort group-agedestination country cells as predicted by the model. π N is the vector of hazard rates from the sample, where the subscript N denotes the sample size. ω is a vector consisting of all the model parameters.
The model is estimated using a simulated method of moment (SMM) estimator, b ω N , of the true parameter vector ω 0 . In particular,
where e π N (ω) is a vector of simulation estimates of the aggregate hazard probabilities implied by the parameter ω. W N (ω) is a semi positive definite weighting matrix. The simulated hazard probabilities are generated by first solving the model to determine the minimal application/renewal returns r * j,t for each age and country in each cohort, and then using these values to calculate the hazard proportions from the simulation. The simulation size is set to be proportional to the sample size N .
Identification, uniformity and continuity conditions required to ensure the consistency and asymptotic normality can be found in McFadden (1989) and Pakes and Pollard (1989) . Given that all the regularity conditions hold (Lanjouw (1998) ) and W N (ω) converges in probability to a semi positive definite matrix W , the asymptotic distribution of b ω N is given by
where Γ and V are the full-ranked derivative matrix and the asymptotic variance matrix of the moment conditions π N (ω) − e π N (ω), respectively.
Hansen (1982) suggests using the sample estimates of the inverse of the asymptotic variances of the moment conditions as the optimal weighting matrix. However, calculating such a weighting matrix is computationally infeasible due to the large dimension of the moment conditions, since there are 18 (number of observed patent ages) times 10 (number of EPO member countries) times 3 (number of cohort groups) of them. Thus in the model estimation the following weighting matrix is then adopted: 19) where n is the number of patents still alive in the specific country-cohort-age cell. In other words, the simulated moment conditions are weighted by the sample size in each cohort-age-destination country cell in calculating the objective function ||G N (ω)||.
Data Analysis
The patent application and renewal data set, compiled from raw data provided by the European Patent Office (EPO), is used in the model estimation. Although in the data set the earliest observation of EPO patent application is from June 1978, we focus on analyzing the pharmaceu- Another advantage of limiting the sample to cohorts 1980 to 1985 is that the member countries of EPO were unchanged during this period, therefore we are able to focus on a period of stable regime without any major institutional changes. This ensures that the differences across patent cohorts may only arise from the quality of underlying inventions but nothing institutional. groups. This decline may either reflect a move toward more stringent patentability standards at the EPO during the sample period, or a change in the quality of the underlying applications (note that the number of applications also rose substantially during [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] . To capture the possibility of such a heterogeneity, in model estimation we group patent applications into three cohort groups: 1980-1981, 1982-1983, and 1984-1985 , and assume that patent applicants form their expectations of grant probabilities based on the observed grant probabilities in each industry-cohort group cell. Different cohort group dummies are also constructed to control for a possible heterogeneity in patent quality. Figure 1 shows the designation rate in each of the 10 EPO member countries from both technology fields, averaged over cohorts 1980 to 1985. Apparently the pharmaceutical patent applicants have a much higher designation rate in many countries. For instance, 90% of the pharmaceutical patent applicants choose to designate Switzerland, while only 42% of the electronics patent applicants do so. Belgium is designated by 84% of the pharmaceutical patent applicants and only 36% of the electronics patent applicants. However, the designation rates in countries with a larger economy, for example Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, are similar.
Patent Designation
Further analysis shows that during 1980 to 1985, the pharmaceutical patent applicants on average choose to designate 8.3 out of the 10 EPO member countries, whereas the electronics patent applicants designate an average of 5.6 countries. If the value of inventions is measured examiners, which is used in categorizing the patents into different technology groups. The detailed grouping criteria are available from the author upon request.
by a simple count of their family size, as in Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) , then the average designation rates would suggest that a typical pharmaceutical invention is 50% more valuable than a typical electronics invention, as the average family size of the former is 50% larger than that of the latter. This may sound plausible, since a patent applicant would compare the net present value of his invention in each country with the application costs, and choose to designate countries wherever the net present value exceeds the designation costs. Therefore, the more countries in which he chooses to seek patent protection, presumably the more valuable the underlying invention is.
However, as noted by Deng (2003) , gauging the private value of patents by simply counting the number of designated countries can be misleading, because the size of the economy of the countries matter. The revenue a patent holder expects to receive from a large economy is presumably higher than that from a small economy because the market size would be larger. In particular, when the application costs in different countries are close, patent applicants would choose to first apply in countries with larger market sizes and then the ones with smaller sizes.
Therefore the relative value of the patents may also depend on the relative market sizes of these countries, as equation (2.10) suggests. Figure 2 displays the patent renewal rate of the two technology groups in Germany, averaged over different cohorts, and Figure 3 shows the average renewal rate in the U.K. In both figures the renewal curve of pharmaceutical patents lies below that of electronics patents at all ages. For instance, of all the pharmaceutical patents transferred to Germany, only 74% are still alive by the end of age 9, while it is 84% for the electronics patents; 24% of the pharmaceutical patents live up to age 18, the last age observed in the sample, whereas 28% of the electronics patents live up to this age. In the U.K., 77% of the electronics patents live up to age 10 and 29% live up to age 18, while it is 70% and 27% for the pharmaceutical patents, respectively. Renewal rates within each cohort group also show a similar pattern.
Patent Renewal
The renewal pattern in some other countries is somewhat mixed. As Figure 4 shows, in
Netherlands the renewal curve of pharmaceutical patents lies slightly above that of electronics patents in early years, with a margin of 1 to 3 percentage points till age 14, after which the renewal rate of electronics patents exceeds that of pharmaceutical patents. Similarly, in Sweden ( Figure 5 ) the renewal rate of pharmaceutical patents is higher than that of electronics patents, for 3 to 5 percentage points at early ages, and the margin shrinks significantly toward the end of patent lives.
When averaged over different countries as weighted by the number of patents in each country, however, the electronics patents clearly have a higher renewal rate at all ages and consequently a longer average life. As Figure 6 indicates, 73% of the electronics patents live up to age 10, while only 66% of the pharmaceutical patents are still alive up to this age; 25% of the electronics patents are kept alive to age 18, 5 percentage points higher than the alive rate of pharmaceutical patents at this age. The median life length of pharmaceutical patents is 12, whereas it is 14 for electronics patents.
Given these facts, a patent renewal model may suggest a higher average value for electronics patents than pharmaceutical patents in these EPO member countries, because the owners of the electronics patents are willing to keep them alive for a longer period of time and pay higher renewal costs. This seems inconsistent with the observed designation pattern, as pharmaceutical inventors choose to designate more countries than electronics inventors. The joint applicationrenewal model will try to resolve this anomaly.
Model Estimation
The model is estimated separately for pharmaceutical and electronics patent groups, so all parameters are allowed to vary across technology fields. To reduce the number of parameters to be numerically estimated and alleviate the computational burden, the real discount factor β is set to equal 0.95, consistent with previous literature. For the same reason, the probability of a patent holder winning an infringement suit is assumed to be fixed at 0.95 in all countries. Table 2 reports the parameter estimates for both the pharmaceutical and electronics patent groups. The model estimation fits the data reasonably well. The weighted Mean Square Error (MSE), constructed as the sum of squared residuals weighted by the number of patents in each cohort group-age-destination country cell, is reported in row C1. Row C2 displays the variance of the actual hazard rates from the sample. The variance of the actual hazard rates can be viewed as the MSE of a "naive" model which predicts that in all cohort group-agedestination country cells the hazard rate would be a constant and is identical to the sample average. Therefore, the difference between the variance of the actual hazard rates and the MSE implied by model estimation can serve as a measure of the improvement of our model's performance over such a "naive" model. As shown in row C3, compared with the "naive" model, the joint application-renewal model improves the fitness of data by about 48% for pharmaceutical patents and about 41% for electronics. Moreover, to separately examine the model's performance in fitting designation and renewal patterns, the total weighted MSE is decomposed into two parts, one in matching the designation rates (row C4) and the other in matching the renewal rates (row C5). By comparing them with the variance of the corresponding actual designation and renewal rates in the sample, we conclude that the estimated model performs well in both dimensions: it improves over the "naive" model by 32% in fitting the pharmaceutical designation pattern and 35% in fitting the electronics designation pattern, and by 53% and 51% in fitting the renewal pattern of these two patent groups, respectively.
Obsolescence and Depreciation Dynamics
The estimates of model parameters are all positive and significant. The estimated annual obsolescence rate θ is close in the two patent groups: each year about 5-6% of patents become obsolete in both technology fields. This estimate is also similar to the estimates of 4.9% to 6.4% obtained in Deng (2004) .
The estimate of the deterministic depreciation rate δ, however, is very different between the two groups. If there is neither obsolescence observed nor new values learned, the expected value of pharmaceutical patents would depreciate at an annual rate of 13%, much faster than the electronics patents (6%). That is to say, other things being equal, pharmaceutical patents tend to have a shorter life than electronics patents, since at later ages the pharmaceutical patent holders are more likely to find that the depreciated patent value is not enough to cover the increasing annual renewal costs, and may choose to let the patents lapse. This is consistent with the observation of a shorter average life for pharmaceutical patents in the data analysis in Section 3. We will explore possible explanations for different depreciation dynamics in these two technology fields below.
Learning Dynamics
The estimated σ for the pharmaceutical patents, which characterizes the stochastic learning processes, is 11,350, significantly higher than that of the electronics patents. For a patent with a given value, a larger σ implies a larger probability of learning a higher value. Therefore, while deterministically the pharmaceutical patents depreciate faster, stochastically they benefit from a more productive learning process at early ages, which may boost their expected values over time.
The comparison between these two technology fields are further complicated when the decay rate of σ t , φ, is taken into account. Recall that the parameter σ t of the exponential distribution that characterizes the learning process is defined as σ t = σφ t−1 in equation (2.3). The estimate of the decay rate φ is 0.56 for pharmaceutical patents and 0.65 for electronics patents.
In other words, although a pharmaceutical patent may have a higher initial learning probability (a higher σ), such probability declines more quickly. And starting from age 8, σ t of the pharmaceutical patents becomes smaller than that of the electronics patents. The estimates of the other parameter of the exponential distribution, γ, are similar for these two technology groups.
It might be more straightforward to simulate the learning process in these two patent groups and examine the implications of these different parameter estimates. Table 3 illustrates the results of a simulation run of cohort group 1980-1981 patents, based on the parameter estimates as reported in Table 2 . Columns 2 to 4 of the table display the percentage of the simulated pharmaceutical patents learning a higher value at each age in Germany, France and the U.K., out of all patents that live up to that age. For instance, at the beginning of age 2, 9% of the pharmaceutical patent applicants discover a use which generates higher subsequent returns than known before in Germany, and 7% in France and the U.K.; at age 3, the learning probability drops to 5% in Germany and 4% in France and the U.K., respectively. The learning probability continues to decline over the ages. By age 5, 1% of the pharmaceutical patent holders find more profitable ways to exploit their patented ideas in these countries, and the learning process of pharmaceutical patents is essentially over by age 9 in France and the U.K. and by age 10 in Germany. After that, the deterministic depreciation and obsolescence processes begin to dominate the renewal decisions.
Columns 5 to 7 of Table 3 report the simulated learning dynamics of the electronics patents.
Similar to the case of pharmaceutical patents, the learning probability in this group also gradually declines over time: in Germany from 8% at age 2 to 1% at age 5, and the learning is over by age 10. In France, learning probability drops from 7% at age 2 to 1% at age 5, and to essentially zero at age 9. Such probability is 9% in the U.K. at age 2, 1% at age 5, and the learning is over by age 9 as well.
The fact that the dynamics of learning probability is similar in pharmaceutical and electronics patent groups reflects offsetting effects of different parameters of the learning processes in these two groups. As noted above, the parameter σ t in the learning process of pharmaceutical patents are initially higher than that of electronics patents, which generates higher probabilities of discovering a higher value for any given level of patent value. However, because the initial returns of pharmaceutical patents is on average higher than those of electronics patents (as shown below in Table 4 ), the actual probability of finding a return exceeding the present level may not be necessarily higher than that of the electronics patents. The first few rows of Table   3 show that the learning probability of pharmaceutical patents at early ages is slightly higher than that of electronics patents in Germany and France, but lower in the U.K. Moreover, the parameter σ t of pharmaceutical patents declines faster over time, and by age 6 it becomes significantly lower than that of electronics patents. From then on, the learning probability of pharmaceutical patents is consistently lower than the corresponding probability of electronics patents.
Pakes (1986) reports that in a sample of German and French patents in the 1950s to 1970s, the learning process is essentially over by the age of 5. Lanjouw (1998) shows that the learning stops by age 6 or 7 in all technology groups in her sample of German patents in 1953 to 1988. In contrast, model estimation here indicates a significantly longer learning process during the life of EPO patents. This suggests that EPO patents have quite different characteristics from the national patents studied in previous literature, most likely, a higher average quality. As the EPO is a multi-country patent protection regime with higher application costs, only those applicants who decide to seek protection in more than one country will choose to apply (otherwise they may choose the cheaper national route in the single country they are interested). This selection process leads to a higher quality on average in the EPO sample than national patent samples examined in previous studies. Owners of these higher-quality patents would expect higher patent values and are thus more willing to experiment new strategies to exploit the patented ideas. On the other hand, the higher revenues from implementing these patented ideas, especially at early ages, also provide their owners more resources for such explorations.
Returns to Market Sizes
The estimated value of υ is significantly different from zero, implying that the patent value in a given country is highly correlated with the market size of the country, and increases as the size of the economy increases, i.e., larger market generates higher returns to patent holders.
However the estimated degree of returns to scale differs significantly in the two technology fields: Estimates of this returns-to-scale parameter have important policy implications. For instance, our estimates suggest that electronics inventors may benefit more from the market integration and patent harmonization in Europe than pharmaceutical inventors in terms of patent protection, other things being equal. This is because the value of an electronics invention in a unified European market would be significantly higher than the sum of values in individual national market due to an increasing returns to scale, whereas for a pharmaceutical invention the value would be almost the same.
The exact reason for such a difference remains unclear, yet we suspect that it may be closely related to the different characteristics of these two technology fields: pharmaceutical products are usually based on a single or only a few specific inventions ("discrete" technology as characterized by Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter (1987)), and because the sales of the final products in different countries usually increase at a constant rate as the market size or the population increases, the patent value would naturally exhibit a constant returns to scale. The production of electronics, on the other hand, may rely on various technologies embodied in a large number of inventions ("complex" technology), and a substantial part of the payoffs of the patents are gathered through cross-licensing agreements. In countries with a larger economy and a larger electronics industry, a patent holder may find more uses and more possibilities to negotiate crosslicensing agreements than in countries with a smaller economy. Therefore it is not surprising that the patent value in this group shows an increasing returns to scale, as a positive externality or spillover effect may occur when various electronics patents are combined together. 9 The estimate of τ also indicates significant correlations between patent returns across different destination countries. Moreover, such correlations decrease as the geographical distance 
Distribution of Initial Returns and Patent Designation
The estimates of μ α and σ α imply that in any specific country, pharmaceutical patents have a higher median initial return and less dispersion than electronics patents, whereas the estimates of σ ε indicates that these patents also exhibit slightly larger dispersion of their initial returns across different countries. These estimates are consistent with Lanjouw (1998)'s findings of a high pharmaceutical patent value based on a Germany sample, but in contrast to Schankerman 9 Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter (1987), Merges and Nelson (1990) , Kusonoki, Nonaka and Nagata (1998), Kash and Kingston (2000) , and Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) all recognize this distinction between "discrete" versus "complex" technology. As Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) explain, "the key difference between a complex and a discrete technology is whether a new, commercializable production or process is comprised of numerous separately patentable elements versus relatively few," and "New drugs or chemicals typically are comprised of a relatively discrete number of patentable elements. In contrast, electronic patents tend to be comprised of a larger number -often hundreds -of patentable elements and, hence, may be characterized as complex." Hall, Jaffe
and Trajtenberg (2004) also argues that "drug industry is characterized by discrete product technologies where patents serve their traditional role of exclusion ... whileas computers and communications is a group of complex product industries where any particular product may rely on various technologies embodied in several patents..."
(1998)'s French patent study that the pharmaceuticals are endowed with low median and mean returns and less dispersions than electronics.
As both authors have noted, France has the most stringent pharmaceutical price regulation and the lowest drug prices in Europe, whereas prices in Germany are largely unregulated and substantially higher than many other west European countries. This may explain why Schankerman (1998) obtains a lower value estimate for pharmaceutical patents than electronics but Lanjouw (1998) has a higher estimate for pharmaceuticals. Our estimates are based on all ten EPO member countries in the 1980s, and are thus abstract from any institutional idiosyncrasy in individual countries. Moreover, both Schankerman (1998) and Lanjouw (1998) only study the patent renewal behavior, whereas our estimation is based on both the patent renewal and patent designation records. The larger average family size of pharmaceutical patents (about 50% larger than electronics) also points to a higher value and explains why our results are consistent with Lanjouw (1998). Table 4 in Germany, $58,100 in France, and $44,400 in the U.K. For the electronics patents, the median of initial returns is $12,500 in Germany, $8,700 in France, and $6,500 in the U.K. Moreover, the initial returns of pharmaceutical patents are on average much higher than those of electronics patents. As reported by Table 4 , the median initial return of pharmaceutical patents is 5 times larger than that of electronics patents in Germany, 5.5 times larger in France, and almost 10 times larger in Austria.
The draw of the initial returns from the distribution determines the patent applicants' designation decisions in different countries. As shown in Figure 7 , the simulated designation patterns match the data reasonably well for both patent groups. Almost all simulated pharmaceutical patents choose to designate Germany, France and Italy at the time of initial filing, and 85% choose to designate the U.K. The designation rate for Luxembourg is 49%, the lowest among all EPO member countries. Corresponding to lower initial returns for the simulated electronics patents, their designation rate is also lower in almost all countries: almost 100% in Germany and
France, but only 90% in Italy and 58% in the U.K. The average number of designated countries is 8.8 for the simulated pharmaceutical patents and 6.3 for the electronics patents, very close to the average number in the actual sample (8.2 for pharmaceutical and 5.5 for electronics patents as shown in Figure 2 ). Table 4 also reveals that the distribution of the initial patent returns is highly skewed. For instance, in Germany, the sum of initial returns of the bottom 50% of pharmaceutical patents applications contributes less than 0.5% of the total initial returns of the whole pharmaceutical group, and over 90% of the total initial returns is attributed to the top 10% patents. The bottom 50% of electronics patent applications contributes only 0.4% of the total initial returns of the whole group in Germany, while the top 10% contributes 91% of the total initial returns. The distribution of the initial returns in other countries has a similar pattern. Thus, the electronics patent owners would have a strong incentive to maintain the size of their patent portfolio, because under asymmetric information this would strengthen their bargaining power. As the quality of patents in the portfolio is heterogeneous, some low-quality or "lemon" patents become unworthy for renewal at some point. However at the equilibrium the owner of the patent portfolio may still choose to "over renew" these "lemon" patents, as doing so will increase the size of his patent portfolio and subsequently increase his bargaining power. Thus the average renewal rate of electronics patents would tend to be higher, ceteris paribus.
Patent Renewal Decisions

Concluding Remarks
This paper formulates a dynamic stochastic model to examine the joint patent application and renewal behaviors under an international patent-protection regime. The model utilizes both cross-sectional (multi-country application) and time-series (patent renewal) dimensions of international patenting data to evaluate the private value of patents in a unified structural framework, allowing us to examine the correlations between the patent family size and the length of patent life, and advancing our understanding of how the patent value changes over time as well as across different countries.
The model is estimated using the designation and renewal records of pharmaceutical and electronics patent applications filed with the European Patent Office during 1980 to 1985. Estimation results suggest that pharmaceutical innovations on average are endowed with higher initial returns, and the patent applicants seek protection in more countries than the electronics patent applicants. However, the value of pharmaceutical patents depreciates faster than that of electronics patents, and consequently they have lower renewal rates and shorter patent lives.
We also find that patent values in different countries are highly correlated with the market size of the country, and patents in these two technology fields have different returns to scale. In addition, compared with the national patents studied in previous literature, inventions filed with the EPO have a much longer learning process of their own values. b. MSE is calculated as the sum of squared residuals weighted by the number of patents in each cohort-agecountry cell. V(π) is the sample variance from the data. Table 3 reports the learning probability from a simulation run of cohort group 1980-1981 patents, based on the parameter estimates reported in Table 2 . Note: Table 4 reports the distribution of the initial patent returns (prior to the designation decision being made) in each of the 10 EPO member countries, based on a simulation run of cohort group [1980] [1981] .
